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Was the Supreme Court right to change 
the law on the right to a speedy trial?
Léonid Sirota*
In R v Jordan,1 the Supreme Court of Canada held, 
by a 5-4 majority and over the vigorous disagree-
ment of the concurrence, that criminal prosecu-
tions in which a trial does not conclude by a set 
deadline will be presumed to breach the right to 
be tried within a reasonable time, protected by 
section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms. Th e acceptable length of proceed-
ings set out in the decision is of 18 months from 
the day charges are laid for cases that proceed 
without a preliminary inquiry, and 30 months 
otherwise. Th e Crown can still show that excep-
tional circumstances outside of its control have 
arisen and can explain — and excuse — a case 
taking longer than that, but unless it does so, a 
stay of proceedings will be the automatic conse-
quence of such delay. Meanwhile, an accused will 
be able to show that delay below these ceilings 
is unconstitutionally unreasonable, but only by 
demonstrating not only that the delay is “mark-
edly” greater than reasonable, but also that he 
or she diligently sought to have the case heard 
sooner. 
While the majority is scathing of the “culture 
of delay” that in its view plagues the Canadian 
criminal justice system, and emphatic about the 
need to change this culture, its decision has been 
much criticized, as I will explain below. For my 
part, I agree that Jordan raises signifi cant ques-
tions regarding the consistency of the majority’s 
decision with constitutional text, the soundness 
of its approach as a matter of policy, the justifi ca-
tion set out for it, and the choice to implement 
this approach by judicial fi at. And yet, there is 
more to be said in its defence than critics allow. 
* * *
Consider, fi rst, whether the majority’s approach 
is consistent with constitutional text. Section 
11(b) of the Charter provides that “[a]ny person 
charged with an off ence has the right … to be 
tried within a reasonable time.” Th e concurrence 
in eff ect argues that this text requires treating rea-
sonableness as a standard and prohibits translat-
ing it into a bright-line rule, as the majority does. 
(Justice Cromwell doesn’t quite put the point in 
this way: he says that the majority’s approach is 
inconsistent with “purpose of the right” — which 
is consistent with the Supreme Court’s tendency 
to treat constitutional text as secondary to the 
“purposes” it is deemed to implement.) Th e 
majority, in my view, does not make much of an 
eff ort to address this argument.
To be sure, the idea of reasonableness nor-
mally refers to a standard, not a rule. But — pre-
cisely for that reason—the constitutional text 
that entrenches this standard calls for judicial 
elaboration or, as modern originalists would say, 
construction.2  In other words, the constitutional 
text itself does not give answers to the questions 
that arise in the course of adjudication. It must 
be supplemented by judicially-developed doc-
trines. Th e question is whether the courts can 
make bright-line numerical rules part of their 
doctrines. (And it is only one part; the major-
ity is right to say that the concurrence some-
what overstates the degree to which the test is a 
numerical one.) Or are such rules simply incon-
sistent with the meaning “reasonableness”? Th is 
is not an easy question; at the very least, I do not 
think that its answer is as clear cut as the con-
currence suggests. Th e fact that reasonableness 
requirements have not thus far been construed 
in this way in Canada or abroad, is signifi cant, 
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but hardly dispositive. It is unfortunate that the 
majority does not address this issue.
Th e concurrence is right, however that the 
majority’s approach to cases that fall below its 
ceilings is a departure from the constitution’s 
text. Th e text provides a right “to be tried within 
a reasonable time”— not a right “to be tried 
within a time that is not markedly unreasonable 
provided that one has been diligent.” Presumably 
the majority introduces these additional require-
ments in order to incentivize defence counsel to 
contribute to the cultural change which it seeks. 
But while understandable, this motivation can-
not justify an obvious inconsistency with the con-
stitutional text. Th at said, the issues of whether 
there can and ought to be a “ceiling” above which 
the burden of proof shift s to the Crown, and just 
what ought to happen below that ceiling, are dis-
tinct. It may be that the majority is right about 
the fi rst even if it is wrong about the second.
* * *
Beyond textual concerns, it is not clear whether 
the majority opinion provides the right approach 
to the issue of delays in the criminal justice sys-
tem as a matter of policy. Jordan came under 
sharp criticism as soon as it was delivered. 
Michael Spratt was especially scathing, arguing 
that “[t]he Supreme Court’s latest decision pays 
lip service to the constitution while doing little to 
improve the pace of Canadian justice.”3  Joanna 
Baron has defended “incrementalism,” in prefer-
ence to the majority’s approach that risks allow-
ing too much time for trials in provincial courts, 
and not enough in the superior courts.4  Lauren 
Heuser called “the ceiling on trial times … wor-
ryingly fi rm,” especially in that it prevents courts 
from making exceptions on account of the “the 
depravity of an off ence,” writing that “[m]ore 
than a few people will be uncomfortable when 
suspected perpetrators of serious crimes walk 
free on perceived legal technicalities.”5 
Ms. Heuser’s prediction, at least, seems 
to have been vindicated, especially in Qué-
bec. Th ere, stays entered in a number of high-
profi le cases have caused considerable concern 
and prompted calls for the Charter’s “notwith-
standing clause” to be invoked.6  Indeed a bill 
to this eff ect has recently been introduced in the 
National Assembly7 — even though, as Maxime 
St-Hilaire’s contributions to this issue show, such 
a bill will not be constitutionally eff ective.
Beyond the legal diffi  culties the invocation 
of the “notwithstanding clause” would face, the 
suggestion that the right to a speedy trial ought 
to be ignored in particularly egregious cases is 
easy enough to dispose of. Th e Charter does not 
speak of “a right to be tried within a reason-
able time, except for those accused of depraved 
off ences.” Th e Jordan majority is quite right to 
say that only the complexity of the legal or fac-
tual issues, rather than the gravity of the charge, 
can justify a prosecution taking longer to con-
clude. Th ose who think otherwise need to amend 
the constitution, not seek to escape it.
Yet the underlying critique — that (relatively) 
fi rm ceilings are not an appropriate response to 
the problem of delay due to the infi nite variety 
of the cases to which they will be applied — is 
serious. I cannot reject it out of hand here. But 
I would like to raise a question for those who 
endorse it. It is, quite simply this: what makes 
you think that a few tweaks to an approach that 
appears to have thoroughly failed are enough? 
Ms. Heuser acknowledged that “[w]hile one can 
question whether this ruling was the best way 
to light a fi re under Canada’s court system, few 
would dispute that a fi re needed to be lit.”8  Th e 
Jordan concurrence does not seem to address 
the majority’s claim that the system suff ers from 
a “culture of delay” directly — which seems like 
a concession. Th e concurrence does argue that 
the majority’s radical approach is unnecessary, 
because the case isn’t even a close one under the 
one that prevailed before Jordan, at least as mod-
ifi ed in its opinion. Yet both the trial court and 
the unanimous Court of Appeal thought that 
the delay which the concurrence thinks is clearly 
unconstitutional was quite alright. I too tend to 
prefer incrementalism, but the time for incre-
mentalism on this issue may well have run out.
Now, that doesn’t mean that what the 
Supreme Court did was right. Just because 
something must be done, and x is something, 
it doesn’t follow that x must be done. But what 
other options were there? Mr. Spratt agreed that 
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“[c]hange is indeed needed” while insisting that 
“we should hold little hope that a cynical judg-
ment from the Supreme Court will change any-
thing.”9  Th is was, in retrospect, too pessimistic,10 
and I think it was always unfair to describe the 
majority opinion in Jordan as “cynical,” despite 
its fl aws. It is easy enough for a blogging defence 
lawyer to rail against the practices of police and 
prosecutors, and the policies of governments, 
and to accuse the courts of complicity. Yet such 
tirades, even if justifi ed, hardly answer the ques-
tion of what a court ought to do when it does 
recognize the existence of a serious problem, 
however belatedly.
* * *
In my view, the most clearly problematic aspects 
of the Jordan decision are not substantive, but 
procedural. A court embarking on a controver-
sial remaking of an important area of the law, 
especially one that is of genuine concern to the 
public, would do well to base its decision on solid 
evidence, and to explain it to potential critics. In 
other words, its decision-making process must 
meet certain — high —standards. It seems to me 
that the Jordan majority did not discharge this 
burden. Th e concurrence castigates the major-
ity for having imposed its presumptive ceilings 
without having been asked to do so by the parties 
and without adversarial debate. It adds that there 
was limited evidence in the record about both 
the current state of aff airs, which the majority 
characterized as “a culture of delay”, and about 
the potential consequences of the new approach. 
Th ese criticisms are justifi ed.
As mentioned above, the majority’s decision 
is a fairly radical departure from the existing 
law. Indeed, the majority is clear that it wants to 
change the way all the actors in the criminal jus-
tice system operate, and that governments may 
well have to spend more to meet their new, or 
at least newly articulated, constitutional obli-
gations. While I have no doubt that the major-
ity did ponder this decision seriously, I do not 
think that it has done enough to articulate its 
rationale. Given the magnitude of the change 
it was considering, and the fact that it was not 
canvassed by the parties in argument, the Court 
should, it seems to me, have re-opened the argu-
ment and invited the parties to make submis-
sions that would have addressed its concerns. 
Indeed, I wonder if the Court could have invited 
Attorneys General, only one of whom (Alberta’s) 
intervened, to participate in the debate.
Alternatively, the Court could have decided 
the case on the basis of the existing framework 
(perhaps modifi ed as suggested by the concur-
rence), and suggested in its reasons that it would, 
in a future case, be willing to entertain submis-
sions on whether that framework should be 
overhauled in the future. Th is would of course 
have delayed the implementation of any pro-
posed changes, but it would also have allowed 
for any decision on whether these changes are a 
good idea to be made on the basis of a record put 
together and tested by the parties, and not only 
of the majority’s own limited research.11 
Speaking of the research, Mr. Spratt argues 
that the majority “did not do what every elemen-
tary school student is taught to do — show his or 
her work.”12  He calls the majority’s framework 
“a product of judicial alchemy and … entirely 
unprincipled.”13  I would not go so far, but an 
opinion that doesn’t show its authors’ work makes 
them vulnerable to such charges. As I wrote aft er 
the Court’s decision in Carter v. Canada (Attor-
ney General),14  “I am happy to assume that the 
Court did its work, but others may not be, and 
neither they nor I should have to take that on 
faith.”15  Sure, the reasons in Jordan are very long, 
but the majority could have produced some sort 
of annex to explain the results of its research 
much better than it has done. It is a question of 
transparency, and arguably even simple respect 
for the public over which the Court is exercising 
a considerable power.
* * *
Putting these signifi cant concerns about the 
majority’s decision-making process to one side, 
there remains the even more fundamental ques-
tion of the legitimacy of reforming the law and 
the legal culture by judicial fi at. Sometimes the 
answer to the question of what one is to do, even 
in the face of a situation crying out for action, is 
nevertheless “nothing”. Th e courts’ role, like that 
of other institutions, is limited. Th e Jordan 
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concurrence suggested that numerical ceilings 
should only be imposed, if at all, by legislation. 
Ms. Baron was also of that view. Th e concur-
rence also criticized the majority for overturning 
settled precedent. So did Ms. Heuser. Both these 
critiques amount to a contention that the major-
ity overstepped the proper judicial remit. I am 
not persuaded of this.
I agree that the majority’s decision is essen-
tially legislative. Th e fact that it felt the need to 
lay out a transitional framework underscores 
this, as transitional provisions are common in 
statutes, but almost unheard-of in judicial deci-
sions, except in the limited form of suspended 
declarations of invalidity—and their legitimacy 
too is sometimes challenged.16  But that alone 
isn’t enough to show that it is not appropriate 
for a court to make such a decision. Some judi-
cial decisions are essentially legislative. One that 
comes to mind is Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta 
Ltd.,17  in which the Supreme Court imposed a 
hard cap on the amount of damages that can be 
awarded for pain and suff ering in personal injury 
cases. Pace such legal philosophers as Ronald 
Dworkin and F.A. Hayek, courts do on occasion 
introduce new rules of law that cannot be derived 
in any straightforward way from either legal prin-
ciples or from the practices prevalent in society, 
and most people seem prepared to live with these 
decisions. Legislatures oft en accept them even 
when they could change or reverse them.
So it is not enough to say that the Court 
eff ectively made new law and thus usurped the 
legislatures’ prerogative. And of course, even if 
the legislatures had enacted statutes to impose 
ceilings on delays in the justice system, the courts 
would still have the last word on their constitu-
tionality. Ruling on ceilings in the context of a 
constitutional challenge to a statute is almost cer-
tainly better from a process standpoint, as such a 
case would likely feature a substantial record of 
the sort that was missing in Jordan. But in terms 
of institutional legitimacy, these two cases would 
not be that diff erent. Indeed, a ruling on the con-
stitutionality of statutory ceilings would come 
with complications of its own, because it would 
confront the courts with very diffi  cult questions 
under section 1 of the Charter, which are avoided 
when, as in Jordan, the constitutional challenge 
is not aimed at a rule or regulation. Most funda-
mentally, can legislative ratifi cation save delays 
that are intolerable if produced by a “culture of 
delay” under section 1 of the Charter as “reason-
able limits” to the section 11(b) rights?
Ultimately, though, the issue is not whether, 
in a perfect world, the legislatures would act to 
limit delays, and how the courts should respond 
to such legislation. Rather, the issue is that until 
they were confronted with the Jordan judgment, 
legislatures and governments had done nothing 
at all to remedy the problem of delays that are 
unconstitutional, not to mention unconscio-
nable. Assuming that such delays are indeed 
endemic, and that there is a “culture of delay”—
which no one denies— the issue is thus the exis-
tence of widespread and ongoing violations of 
the constitutional rights of thousands of people. 
Th ese violations have to be remedied. Sure, it is 
not the courts’ job to pursue policy objectives to 
which the elected offi  cials fail to attend. But it is 
not mere policy that is at stake here. Sure, courts 
should beware of disregarding the limits on their 
power because doing so undermines the Rule 
of Law.  But doesn’t systematic disregard for the 
Constitution undermine the Rule of Law too? 
If the governments will not bring themselves in 
conformity with their constitutional obligations, 
shouldn’t the courts try to make them? And if the 
courts do not, who will?
* * *
All this is to say, I am not convinced that the 
majority opinion in Jordan is as fatally fl awed as 
its critics believe. Admittedly, its interpretation 
of the Charter is not beyond question; its chosen 
solution to what is admittedly a grave problem is 
questionable; the process it followed in reaching 
its decision was fl awed; and perhaps, all things 
considered, it should not have endeavoured to do 
more than mitigate that problem’s worst mani-
festations. But it is far from clear that this is so. It 
is diffi  cult to get the government to comply with 
its constitutional obligations—and someone has 
to do it.
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